United Nations Mission/Medak Pocket

History

In 1948, motivated by the desire to create a strong independent economy, Josip Broz Tito became the first (and the only successful) socialist leader to defy Stalin's leadership in President Josip Tito the Cominform(Communist Information Bureau) he was one of the few people to stand up to Stalin's demands for absolute loyalty. Stalin took it personally – for once, to no avail. "Stop sending people to kill me", Tito wrote. "If you don't stop sending killers, I'll send one to Moscow, and I won't have to send a second." The Yugoslav Communist Party was expelled from the association on June 28, 1948. This rift with the Soviet Union brought Tito much international recognition, but also triggered a period of instability often referred to as the Informbiro period. Tito's form of communism was labeled Titoism by Moscow, which encouraged purges against suspected "Titoites'" throughout the Communist Bloc. The crisis nearly escalated into an armed conflict.

After Stalin's death Tito rejected the USSR's invitation for a visit to discuss normalization of relations between two nations. Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin visited Tito in Belgrade in 1955 and apologized for wrongdoings by Stalin's administration. Tito visited the USSR in 1956, which signaled to the world that animosity between Yugoslavia and USSR was easing.However, the relationship between the USSR and Yugoslavia would reach another low in the late 1960s

Under Tito's leadership, On April 7, 1963, the country changed its official name to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Reforms encouraged private enterprise and greatly relaxed restrictions on freedom of speech and religious expression. In 1966 an agreement with the Vatican was signed according new freedom to the Yugoslav Roman Catholic Church, particularly to teach the catechism and open seminaries. Tito's new socialism met opposition from traditional communists culminating in conspiracy headed by Aleksandar Rankovic.In the same year Tito declared that Communists must henceforth chart Yugoslavia's course by the force of their arguments (implying a granting of freedom of discussion and an abandonment of dictatorship). The state security agency (UDBA) saw its power scaled back and its staff reduced to 5000.

On January 1, 1967 Yugoslavia was the first communist country to open its borders to all foreign visitors and abolish visa requirements. In the same year Tito became active in promoting a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. His plan called for Arabs to recognize State of Israel in exchange for territories Israel gained.Arabs rejected his land for peace concept.

Tito's greatest strength, in the eyes of the western communists, had been in suppressing nationalist insurrections and maintaining unity throughout the country. It was Tito's call for unity, and related methods, that held together the people of Yugoslavia. This ability was put to a test several times during his reign, notably during the so-called Croation Spring.(also referred to as masovni pokret, maspok, meaning "mass movement") when the government had to suppress both public demonstrations and dissenting opinions within the Communist Party. Despite this suppression, much of maspok's demands were later realised with the new constitution. On May 16, 1974 the new Constitution was passed, and Josip Broz Tito was named President for Life.

With the death of Josip Tito in 1980 came the slow dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of YugoslaSlobodan Milosevicvia. Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics including Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Culturally similar in language and culture, they had been held together by Tito's iron rule. Following his death the republics became increasingly restive, and the centralized communist authority collapsed in the late 80's. Nationalist forces in the increasingly independent republics took the opportunity to seize the political stage, deconstructing Tito's carefully balanced federation in their own favour using the inflammatory rhetoric of race and faith. Slobodan Milosevic attempted to bring the other republics to heel through his control of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), in the name of his personal dream of a "Greater Serbia". This was obviously unacceptable to the other republics in the crumbling federation, and in 1991 Slovenia seceded from the federation and declared independence, followed quickly by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What was to become known as the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was an ethnically diverse state, with ethnic Serbs scattered throughout Croatia and Bosnia. Unhappy to discover their minority status within newly independent states, the ethnic Serbs organized themselves into paramilitary resistance movements, and two separate civil wars erupted. An increasingly ineffective JNA gave considerable assistance to these movements before dissolving into the Serbian military, and the nascent Croatian and Bosniac armies struggled just to survive. The fighting in the first of the Yugoslav wars was characterised by the use of amateurs and foreign mercenaries, resulting in tremendously destructive warfare, atrocities against civilians and the increasing prevalence of a new horror - ethnic cleansing. The fledgling armies of the combatants had mastered none of the combat functions and had little or no knowledge of the conduct expected of professional soldiers, but they did know how to kill. Unsurprisingly for amateurs, they found it easier to attack each other's civilians than to face off against armed opponents, and so the fighting was savage and unrestrained. Serious human rights violations were systematically applied to "enemy" populations.

THE VANCE PLAN - UNPA AND THE "PINK ZONES"

In south-central Croatia, at the feet of the Velebit mountains, lay the historic frontier between the former empires of the Ottomans and the Austrian Hapsbergs. It was here on the old frontier - or Krajina, that the Serb militias made the greatest gains, capturing the Lika region and declaring themselves to be the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), and independent of Croatia. With JNA assistance, the RSK strove to reach the Adriatic and cut Croatia in half. By November of 1991, the exhausted combatants in Croatia were prepared to accept a ceasefire and international intervention under the direction of the UN.

Croatia and Bosnia 1993 – “Pink” Zones

This mission became known as the United Nations protection Force 1 (UNPROFOR 1) under the Vance Plan agreement. The fighting line stabilised when this agreement was formalised in February 1992, and the combatants withdrew to lick their wounds and prepare for another round. The Croatian Army (HV), Croatian Union National Guard and Territorial Armies took advantage of the break to upgrade their training and combat capabilities, and rearm. Four disputed territories were to be patrolled by the UN, known as United Nation Protected Areas (UNPA), where the ceasefire was occasionally respected. Not all of the newly established frontier between the warring parties fell within the confines of the UNPAs, known as Sector West, East, South and North. These other contested regions were known as the "Pink Zones". Key to the Croatian defence of this new frontier was the town of Gospic, a command and control centre and logistical crossroads vital to the communication lines between the south and north of Croatia. From 1991-1993, Gospic was repeatedly shelled from an area nearby within a Serb-held salient in the line centred on the villages of Pocitelj, Licki Citluk and Medak. This was a rural area whose tactical importance had made it an important bastion in the Serb RSK line, held by the RSK 15 Corps. The salient was known as the Medak Pocket, and was located in a Pink zone right next to Sector South.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CANBAT 1 - 2 PPCLI DEPLOYS TO CROATIA

When the HV launched their attack into the UNPA in January 1993, it almost caused the termination of the UNPROFOR. The assault eventually ground to a halt as the Serbs reinforced, but the Croats had gained their first major tactical victories before they were forced to return to the bargaining table, and they were greatly emboldened by this success. Four high value military objectives seized by the RSK earlier in the war fell back into Croatian control: the Maslenica Bridge - a crucial logistics point; the Peruca Dam; the Zemunik Airport and the Molivaki Plateau. For Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Calvin, newly-arrived in Croatia, these developments were to have major import for the future. The Canadian contribution to UNPROFOR was known as CANBAT 1, and was composed of a reinforced infantry battle group based on the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 PPCLI). The UN had fought a hard battle with the Canadian government over the composition of this force, deeming it to be too "aggressive" for peacekeeping operations. LCol Calvin brought this point home to the Standing Committee on Defence and Veterans’ Affairs in 1998: peacekeeping had “evolved” in dangerous new ways since the 1970s and 1980s, and Canadian soldiers found themselves in a totally new environment. They were no longer interposing themselves between two parties who had agreed to a ceasefire. The situation was far more “warlike”, and called for determined action and the ability to defend themselves and innocent civilians.

When the 2 PPCLI Battle Group was preparing for their UNPROFOR mission, there was little reason to suspect that there was anything more than a typical "blue helmet" operation. The strategic reconnaissance for the Battle Group returned from the Krajina in Sector West with an far different story. Peacekeeping in the classic sense would not be an option between the streetfighting factions in the FRY. LCol Calvin stuck to his guns, and intensified the training of his Battle Group. The 2 PPCLI Battle group would deploy as a fully mechanized formation, riding in their tracked M-113 carriers, with Tube-launched Optically-sighted Wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles, an 81mm mortar platoon, an assault pioneer platoon, and four rifle companies. Since taking command of 2 PPCLI, LCol Calvin had already dispatched 180 men from his battalion to Croatia to reinforce LCol Nordick's 3 PPCLI Battle Group. This left him with a core of 375 Patricias to form the basis for his own 2 PPCLI Battle Group. To fill out the ranks he took 165 soldiers from other Regular Force units, and the largest contingent ever of reservists.

Of the 550 reservists who arrived for training at the start of January, only 385 would be chosen for the mission. Lacking the breadth of experience and the cohesion of their Regular Force counterparts, they were nonetheless enthusiastic about the mission and were put to their paces in a gruelling training regimen designed to teach them the soldier skills and small-unit tactics they would need to survive. Behind LCol Calvin's plan lay the distressing logic of how much training was required to mould cohesion and esprit de corps in a battalion. Weapons training and live-fire training up to platoon-level were completed at a feverish pace in Fort Ord California, and some company-level exercises were run, but there was simply no time to complete the training. They were not able to practice battalion-level operations, which were supposedly not required since they were deploying on a "peacekeeping" mission. LCol Calvin had reason to be thankful later that his battalion would not encounter their greatest challenge until the end of the tour, after they had been moulded by events into a cohesive fighting force.

THE ERDUT AGREEMENT

If the events of the Croatian winter offensive raised the morale of the HV and their paramilitary, mercenary and militia allies, they had the opposite effect on the Serbs. The French battalion operating in Sector South was totally discredited in the eyes of the RSK and their JNA supporters. The Peruca Dam was disabled and the airport was abandoned, but the loss of the Maslenica bridge was a particularly sore loss for the Krajina Serbs, and the HV occupation of Molivaki Plateau would allow the Croatian artillery to reach the RSK capital of Knin, and avenge the shelling of Gospic. This fact alone threatened the very existence of the Vance Plan and UNPROFOR’s mandate. For his part, General Jean Cot, the French commander of UN Forces, seemed to feel the entire peace plan was foundering, and he placed intense diplomatic pressure on the opposing forces to adhere to the ceasefire. In mid-July General Cot was finally able to direct CANBAT 1 to intervene in Sector South. His clear intent was to impose a buffer zone between the two combatants in the four contested areas: UNPROFOR would insert themselves between the armies, take over the conflict line, then force the two sides apart, until they had reached their original start lines. The 2 PPCLI Battle Group had learned a great deal since their deployment to Sector West in March, and were considered to be General Cot's “go-to” unit when the order came to redeploy. LCol Calvin proved this by moving his new sub-unit in 150 APCs overland in just under 36 hours to deploy to their new areas of responsibility. The UN Force commander was greatly impressed with this logistical wonder, and came to rely even more heavily on his Canadian contingent. LCol Calvin's command was now spread out over two republics from the Adriatic Sea to Slavonia, extending 2,500 square km.

CANBAT 1 – THE UN'S FIRE DEPARTMENT

At the start of September, General Cot's plan began to take effect after intense negotiations, and LCol Calvin's rump battalion was trying to find accommodations for their platoons in the French Battalion (FREBAT 1) zone. This Area of Responsibility (AOR) was centred in the pink zone next to Sector South in a salient centred on the village of Medak. For this operation, LCol Calvin's Battle Group had been reinforced with two French Company Groups from Sector North and the Bihac area of Bosnia. This was very good news for the Canadians, as the French Company Groups were reinforced Company formations with attached engineer support, armoured vehicles mounting 20mm cannons, and integral support echelon elements. The Croats had not been idle behind their negotiations. Rearmed and reinvigorated by their successes in January, they decided to overrun the pocket, at Medak, and this time to make a permanent solution there. General Bobetko, the Croatian Chief of Army Staff, later bragged in his published memoirs of how thoroughly they had planned their "great success" in the Medak Pocket Operation. Charlie Company (C Coy) under Maj Brian Bailey, had arrived in Sveti Rok, and were trying to find suitable lodging for their platoons in the area surrounding the village of Medak. Lt Tyrone Green, a Reserve platoon commander with the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, was in command of 9 Platoon (9 Pl) at Medak House. The Krajina Serbs continued their shelling of the Gospic area of Croatia from the Medak Pocket throughout the summer, and they had an important command post in the village of Medak proper.

This was the situation at the end of August, as Lt Green's 9 Pl deployed into the area. The Battalion had not had the time to gain an appreciation for their new AOR when the Croatian offensive struck. Major Bailey, already on his second tour in Croatia, and having developed an understanding of the ebbs and flow of the conflict, went on a tour of the line. He was particularly concerned about the area of the Lika Fields, halfway from Sveti Rok to Gospic on the main road, as this was an area rife with military intelligence gathering posts. In the middle of the Lika Fields lay Medak. He noted on his tour that the Serb 9th Brigade was at only half strength in the line, about 1000 men, and that they were second-line Home Guard (Domobran) formations, lacking discipline, soldier skills, and morale after two years of war. Taking over from the FREBAT platoon in Medak, 9 Pl was in between a rock and a hard place. To the local Serbs, who had come to despise the FREBAT for the way they stepped aside during the Croatian offensive in January, they were more foreign interlopers come to interfere with Serb rights. The Croats saw only that the Canadians had occupied a position within the Serb lines, next to the Serb headquarters (HQ). Implementing General Cot's buffer zone between the two warring parties was going to be a very difficult operation.

OPERATION MEDAK POCKET

In early September Medak House was a hive of activity, as 9 Pl went about settling into their new home, hopefully their last “new home” of the tour. On the early morning of 9 September, the Croatian attack began in earnest. LCol Calvin received word from 9 Pl of an attack about 5km up the line from Medak House. Heavy artillery began to fall across the entire sector: from the Maranji Crossings manned by B Coy down in Sector South, across the Observation Post (OP) lines of the entire Battalion AOR, across the Maslenica bridge and right into Medak. After the first hour of shelling, 9 Pl began to count the shells. In the next 24-hr period more than 500 shells fell within 400m of Medak House. The platoon house was insufficiently dug-in after only a few days of preparation and a very busy schedule. As the shelling tapered off, the soldiers of 9 Pl would hop in an APC, and drive into the village to evacuate wounded civilians. It quickly became apparent that the UN posts were not being directly targeted, so there was little the soldiers of the battalion could do according their Rules of Engagement (ROE) to return fire at this point. It hardly mattered, as CANBAT 1 - which was due to redeploy to Canada in under a month, had left their 81mm mortars behind in Sector West. From the morning of 9 September until the evening on the 10th, 9 Pl and their OP were cut off by fire in the Medak Pocket, and were the only UN eyes in Medak

The intense negotiations in Zagreb were driven by the observations being sent out of the pocket by Sgt Rudy Bajema's section in their OP in the hills above Medak.

"It was the fireworks show of a lifetime. They saw a MIG jet take out a tank as the Croat air force got involved; they saw the villages being pounded; they saw fires blazing and smoke rising as the Croats forced people from their homes."

The Croatians conducted a classic pincer attack. General Mirko Norac led his 9th Lika Wolves Brigade, reinforced with a company of 10-12 tanks, down the road from Gospic. General Mladen Markac, leading the Croat special forces and secret police, flanked west through the Velebit mountains and appeared suddenly from the left flank. While the Mechanized formations pounded the Serb positions, the special forces achieved tactical surprise and rolled up the flank, easily dispatching the Serb defenders. Despite this simple and effective plan, the Croat operations - and the Serb retaliations - lacked sophistication. It was like witnessing an attack drawn from the Western Front in the Great War. A simple plan executed with a minimum of coordination and rudimentary communications. Even the artillery fires were uncoordinated, not much more than a set-piece creeping barrage, without disciplined counter-battery fire or the ability to react in a timely manner. The new armies of the Serbs and Croats were still crude formations with low skillsets in 1993.

What happened next was another classic manoeuvre. Unable to man the entire line in Sector South, the Serb defence hinged on another lesson of the Great War - reinforcement by rail. Only a skeleton crew were left at the front in any given sector, but in the afternoon on 10 September, a train pulled up on the line behind Medak and off-loaded 800 Serbs and their attached company of 10-12 tanks. A further 1000 Domobran arrived in the area by truck. The Serbs launched a Frog missile from the Bihac pocket into a suburb of the Croat capital Zagreb, and intensified their shelling of the city of Karlovac. It was enough - the confrontation line was re-established northwest of Poticelj and Medak. The Croats gained approximately 22 square kilometres in the Medak salient, and overran the homelands of 1,300 ethnic Serbs.

With his hands tied by the UNPROFOR ROE in effect, LCol Calvin could do little to respond to the shelling of his troops. His 81mm mortars, the only integral indirect fire support available to the CANBAT, were still in Sector West. Charlie Company had taken four casualties from artillery; two outside Sveti Rok and two outside Medak House. Their evacuation by road was a nightmare, and Major Bailey was very relieved they got out. Across C Coy's front line, fear changed to anger and frustration as the Patricias watched events unfold. Since no-one fired directly at them, they were unable to return fire. A fever of war swept across Croatia and Serbia. Bosnia, which needed little encouragement, spiralled into even deeper violence.

As if to highlight the isolation of CANBAT 1 in their defensive posture in Croatia from affairs at home in Canada, the Patricias received a visit from their Colonel-in-Chief, Lady Patricia, Countess Mountbatten of Burma. While the ceasefire held from 11-14 September, Lady Patricia went as far forward as Medak House to present decorations and awards to her Patricias. As though her serene presence had kept the factions apart, LCol Calvin went from escorting her to the airport, into an impromptu battle procedure for implementation of the ceasefire.

THE BATTLE OF MEDAK POCKET - 15-16 SEPTEMBER 1993

Amidst the diplomatic histrionics and hand-wringing, General Cot demanded an agreement between the representatives. LCol Calvin was in Gracac hammering out the peacekeeping details of the agreement the UNPROFOR would begin enforcing as soon as it was signed. Paralleling the points of the Erdut Agreement, the Croats would move back to their 9 September start-line, and the Serbs would remain where they were at the end of 11 September. Into the gap thus created within the lines would go CANBAT 1 with its French companies attached. They would move into the lines of the opposing combatants and pry them apart, creating General Cot's buffer zone. As in Sector West, weapons carriage was to be forbidden, while weapons carried after the agreement went into effect were subject to seizure.

Around this time, Major Craig King arrived in Sveti Rok by bus from Sector West with A Coy. Having little more on their persons than their helmets and full fighting order, they were disquieted by the heavy fighting going on around them. To Major King, watching the heavy weapons that had been securely quarantined in cantonments being used with reckless abandon around him, it seemed that their mission and all their hard work was undone. They moved on to the newly christened camp Kananaskis in Sveti Rok. Although Major King requested protection for his company there was none to be found - it was all forward with the companies in contact. His men would remain on foot. The 2PPCLI Battle Group was still dangerously over-extended, with most of the companies on the road to their new locations in Sector South. LCol Calvin HV Forces hold Positions and gave orders after a hastily completed battle procedure at 1600 hours on 14 September. General Cot came by to emphasize two points - the first was that the situation for the UNPROFOR mission was very grave, and it was very important that the CANBAT meet their objectives. The second point was that General Cot doubted "very much" that the Croats had told their soldiers in the line about the withdrawal. As a result of this LCol Calvin reset his H-Hour to give the Croats more time to pass the information to their subordinate commanders.

LCol Calvin's intent was to insert his force into the front line and establish the buffer zone. An implied task he foresaw was to document any Croat or Serb breaches of the Law of Armed Conflict. To accomplish this implied task, he assigned Major King, OC A Coy, which was being held in reserve. Major King was tasked to lead an investigative sweep team of picked individuals from UNPROFOR's civilian and police assets, supplemented by hand-picked soldiers from CANBAT 1. This sweep team would go into the Medak pocket once his primary task of establishing the buffer zone was accomplished. LCol Calvin’s plan to accomplish this aim, finally agreed to by the combatants late the following morning, was in four phases. Phase One would begin when C Coy and 15 French Coy crossed their Line of Departure (LD), and occupied the Serb front line. In Phase Two, C Coy would secure and occupy a crossing point on the main paved road in the no-man's-land between the combatants, under the protective overwatch of Anti-Armour Platoon's TOW carriers. Phase Three would begin as the reserve force of D Coy and 17 French Coy moved through the secure crossing point, moving forward to occupy the Croat defensive live. The CANBAT Tactical Headquarters and the Reconnaissance Platoon would follow D Coy into the pocket. The final phase of the operation would begin once D Coy was in position - the two companies would escort HV and their paramilitary and reserve formations back to the "9 September Line", completing the separation of the combatants and the creation of a new demilitarized zone. By 0900 hours on the 15th, C Coy was reinforced by D Coy and 15 French Coy in the area just south of Medak. H-hour had originally been set for 1330 hours, but was now moved back to 1400 hours. Due to communication difficulties, C Coy stepped off at 1330 hours - the original timing. They were under direct small arms fire immediately. In regards to the disposition of his force, LCol Calvin gave the following testimony to the Sharpe Inquiry in 1998:

"Sometimes [the opposing lines -ed.] were 400 metres apart, sometimes 1,200 metres apart; it varied on the terrain. But you can appreciate that if each side had now taken the point of terrain that was the most tactically sound to defend, the terrain that was in between them was what we normally refer to as a killing zone, and that was the area into which we were moving the Canadians and the French."

9 PLATOON ADVANCES

Lt. Tyrone Green had been through a rough week. His platoon had borne the weight of the artillery attack on the 9th and 10th of September. Now having received his “go” order, the last thing he wanted to do was to hang around in his attack position behind the LD all day, especially since his LD was the Serb defensive line. Upon arrival, it was apparent that there had just been a furious exchange of fire between the two sides. The Serbs appeared rattled and scared. Their relief was apparent when they heard what the Canadians were there to do. Shortly after noon he received a cryptic communication over the UN radio net (which was always monitored necessitating the use of veiled speech) to the effect that the Croats were not all in agreement with the withdrawal plan. This gave a special urgency to his desire to step off before dark. Receiving permission from Maj Bailey, he stepped off at 1330hrs. His vehicles came immediately under direct small arms fire. Thinking the combatants had mistaken their identity in the fray despite the white painted vehicles and UN markers, Lt Green ordered the UN flags attached to each antenna to be flown. As soon as the antenna went up and the flags were flown, the fire went from occasional small arms strikes on their vehicles to direct machinegun fire. The troops had a giant UN flag from Medak House, and they pulled this into the open. At that point the fire changed to direct-fire from an anti-aircraft gun. It was apparent that the Croats were not confused.

In 2002, speaking with Carole Off of CBC’s The National, Lt Tyrone Green traced the unfolding of events as follows:

"The first time we got fire, as we were just breaching through the Serb lines to come out, we thought – well, maybe they don’t know this is [the] UN – so we let the antennas up to show the flag [UN Flag] – and we received more fire. So we decide, well, we’ve got this big flag that was the size of a bed sheet that we were flying above the Medak House – and we put that up. So now there’s not going to be any way that they’re not going to know this was UN forces. So we did that…and then we started taking anti-aircraft fire – in the direct role."

Finally allowed to return fireaccording totheir ROEs, i did not take long for 9 Pl to respond in kind. Lt Green could see the danger of his position, and was aware that if they sat on their LD in the Serb defensive line it would appear as though they were embedded with the Serbs, so he determined to move forward. One vehicle at a time 9 Pl inched into the no-man's land between the lines:

"Basically we walked one armoured vehicle out at a time – just walked out about ten feet, took fire, waited a couple seconds, walked it out a little bit farther – and eventually just showed to the Croatians that we weren’t leaving – we were eventually going to get out in front of the Serbs and establish our positions."

Lt Green crawled forward to the Serb trench line then turned over onto his back to observe his dismounted platoon, deployed in the tree line to his rear. When he called for warning shots to be fired towards the Croats, the tree line erupted with fire. The Patricias were happy to finally be able to fire back. Lt Green advanced his platoon bit by bit, returning fire when it was received, towards the Croat trench line. A Croat tank in the line levelled its cannon towards the platoon, so Lt Green told the TOW carrier to break the tree line where it could be seen. The Croat tank commander apparently found his services were required elsewhere, and moved off quickly. Slowly, the Patricias moved right up to the Croat trench line, and all firing ceased. 9 Pl was in position.

8 PLATOON - LICKI CITLUK

Captain McKillop, platoon commander of 8 Pl, C Coy, took full advantage of an opportunity to conduct a reconnaissance that morning, and had a good idea of the lay of the land. He knew that his new position at Citluk lay on the edge of the buffer zone, and saw 8 Platoon, C Companythe layout of the hamlet. When he pulled up behind the school in Citluk, his platoon was too tightly spaced in the attack position, so he had his platoon warrant reposition the vehicles. All of this was taking a while to accomplish, so Sgt Dearing spoke to his platoon commander, seized the initiative and crossed the LD. He moved his call sign out into the middle of the opening, put the UN flag up an antenna mast, and stopped short when he realized his way forward was blocked by a necklace of anti-tank mines. Capt McKillop had not much more luck himself, as he ran into a human roadblock of Serbs as he passed the third house in the village. By slowly moving the vehicle forward, the driver literally forced the Serbs off the road. An engineer section came forward and the platoon began to dig shell scrapes and a vehicle run-up for three section’s exposed APC. It was a good thing they dug in.

Around 1500hrs they began to receive direct fire, single shots from a marksman or sniper, intent on the Canadians. While they dug in, the Serbs and Croats exchanged fire. From the Croat lines, 8 Platoon appeared to be intermingled with the Serbs, and the Croats began targeting the Patricias. WO Desbarres and Sgt Janz were digging the platoon trench when the first effective rounds snapped into the tree behind their heads. WO Desbarres ordered the .50 cal to fire a warning burst, and the firefight broke out spontaneously from there. 2 Section came under effective fire and returned fire, and the Patricias began the first of several protracted firefights, and were under nearly constant fire for the next fifteen hours. In the early minutes of that first firefight, the engineers used a chainsaw to cut a way into the boarded-up bakery, where Capt McKillop established his command post. Throughout the rest of that long day, while they dug in, the Croats continued to engage the Patricias. Capt McKillop argued with the Serbs to keep them from bringing in and setting up heavy weapons, since he felt this was antagonizing the Croats. Once the intensity of the fighting became clear, one of the machine guns which was positioned up in a barn loft in an overwatch position, needed to be repositioned. It was unable to engage the hedgerow the Croats were firing out of because it was too exposed.

Communication with headquarters was difficult the entire net was filled with back chatter and the United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) providing guidance. When Capt McKillop did get through, he had difficulty communicating the situation, particularly the fact that they were being deliberately targeted by the Croats. That there was misunderstanding was evident when he was ordered to talk to the Serbs and get them to stop antagonizing the Croats. C Coy obviously thought they were simply caught in the cross fire between the combatants. The Croats and Patricias fought another pitched battle at 2100 hours, and then again at 2200 hours. Calls to higher brought orders from the UNMOs to talk to the Serbs! They UNMOs still would not believe they were under deliberate, effective fire from the Croat positions. Captain McKillop eventually asked his company headquarters whether he was to take orders from them or the UNMO team, and invited the UNMOs out to Citluk to speak to the Serbs for themselves. He even offered them an escort. Their last engagement came at 0600 hours on the morning of 16 September.

MEXICAN STANDOFF - DELTA COMPANY AT THE CROSSING POINT

While C Coy and 15 French Coy fought their pitched battle with the Croats throughout the night, LCol Calvin worked hard to get the fighting stopped and phase two of his plan implemented. Accompanied by the UNPROFOR Chief of Staff, (Col Maissoneuve, a fellow Canadian officer), newly arrived from Zagreb, LCol Calvin set off up the road with an UNMO in a jeep to talk to the Croatians. They were allowed safe passage through the conflict line to Gospic, where they met General Ademi, the Croat Operational Zone Commander. A very difficult negotiation ensued, but in the end Ademi agreed that phase two should occur later that night, with the understanding that phase three would not be implemented until noon the next day. This last qualifier was key to Ademi's agreement in the end - the Croats needed time to inform the HV and paramilitary units in the line of the ceasefire plan, he insisted. Maj Dan Drew moved a reinforced D Coy headquarters section up the road to occupy the crossing point once he was given the new ceasefire terms. He was joined at the crossing point by the remainder of D Coy the following morning.

D Coy became aware of the true horror of their situation the following morning, as dawn lifted the veil of shadows from a shattering reality - the Medak pocket was burning. Smoke from the burning villages could be seen behind the HV lines, while the air was punctuated with sounds of explosions and automatic weapons fire. Those Serbs who had not fled the Croatian advance were still being cleared out of their villages by the Croatian Special Police. UNPROFOR waited, while LCol Calvin demanded action, recalling Col Maissoneuve to demand a Croatian ceasefire from Gen Ademi. The simple fact of their UN mandate did not allow for a frontal assault on the entire HV 9th Brigade. To transition from a dispersed defensive posture, organize for an advance and force their way forward under the circumstances was "a bridge too far" to say nothing of being outgunned and out-manned. The UNPROFOR had a front-row seat to the ethnic cleansing of the Medak Pocket, unable to move forward until the noon deadline had passed. Major Drew and D Coy pressed forward in their M-113 carriers at the appointed hour only to find a heavily-defended roadblock just up the road. On the left of the road sat a T-72, while the right of the road was covered by two towed anti-tank guns and a line of Sagger anti-tank guided missiles. A company of dug-in infantry behind a hasty minefield made the position complete. When Major Drew demanded access, he was denied by the Croatian officer manning the barrier. D Coy sat in this predicament for an hour, the Canadian soldiers resolutely staring down the Croatians despite their frustration and anger.

LCol Calvin arrived to talk to the Croatian officer at the roadblock. When he realized that this was BGen Mezic, the senior liaison officer to Gen Ademi, he realized that Ademi had been lying from the start. Mezic was stalling to give the Croatian Special Police time to clean-up evidence of their ethnic cleansing operations, which the UNPROFOR had just heard and seen. Angry and frustrated, LCol Calvin used the media to break the impasse. Twenty journalists had been huddled tensely behind the Canadian carrier waiting for the situation to break down into open warfare. Calvin used the media to great effect, giving an impromptu media briefing at the front of his column, with the ethnic cleansing of the Medak Pocket as his backdrop. In blunt, undiplomatic terms he described the ethnic cleansing going on behind them in the pocket, and had the film crews film the Croatian roadblock as evidence of their unwillingness to implement the ceasefire:

"At some stage you have got to cut the Bullshit and get on with the job. And all I've heard right now from the Croatian people at my level is a bunch of half-baked excuses aimed at delaying us from getting on with the operation..."

GATHERING EVIDENCE

When Maj Dan Drew led D Coy into the Medak Pocket, followed by the LCol Calvin's Tactical Headquarters and his Recce Pl, they could hardly have imagined the horror that awaited them. They were prepared to assist casualties, and gather evidence. The sheer magnitude of the devastation they found, and the eerie silence after the noise of explosions and shootings in the morning, was crushing. They had arrived too late to help the Serbs in the Medak Pocket, but they had forced their way in before the Croatian Special Police could complete their clean-up. Every building had been burned or flattened by mines. Now they understood the truckloads of wood they had seen the Croats trucking in - tinder to light the sturdy stone and mortar farmhouses of the Medak. Everywhere there were shell casings, accompanied by a similar number of disposable latex gloves, indicating that the Croats had been moving bodies to hide evidence. Grisly, burned corpses were found, 29 in all. Hundreds of Serbs went missing, and were never to return. Thousands had been displaced from their homes, which were systematically razed. Even the farm animals that could not be taken had been shot. There was no life in the Medak Pocket.

For the remaining few weeks of their tour, the members of CANBAT 1 did a job they were never trained for with grim determination and pride. The Patricia's acted as untrained investigators, gathering evidence, taking photographs, and searching for survivors who were never found. They received high praise from the UN and the International Community (and General Cot in particular) for this role. Evidence gathered at this time was crucial in bringing indictments against Norac and Ademi for War Crimes.

It was the grimmest possible ending to what had been a very successful tour. Everywhere they were sent, the Patricias bore the standard of Canada, showing discipline and resolve, and bolstered a failing UN mission. General Cot used them like a fire brigade, sending them across the breadth of the country to use their cool professionalism and determination to confront thugs and murderers, mercenaries, bandits and racists. In every spot they found a different mix of combatants (and usually a different local bad-guy), as they struggled mightily to intervene in a complex and murderous civil war. Wherever they were sent, those who met the Patricias followed what became a familiar pattern. Those who were against the UN presence were dismayed and angered to have such effective and determined soldiers confronting them. Those who were desperately waiting for some form of order to be re-established found it in the Patricias, and were very grateful and hospitable.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF COMMENDATION - 2002

General Cot was the first to recognize the Canadians for their efforts and the success they brought to a failing mission. He presented CANBAT 1 with a UN Force Commander's commendation for their role in Sector South and Sector West. This was unprecedented, never having been awarded by UNPROFOR before, but back home in Canada this news fell on deaf ears. The only news on the Army was bad news, emanating out of Somalia and Rwanda. For the next four years, a nervous DND hierarchy squashed reports of fighting on UN missions to the FRY. Only when the story broke in the Croatian media, alleging 27 Croats had been killed, and claiming many more casualties from the firefights of 15-16 September, did the story of the battle of Medak Pocket surface in Canadian media sources. Even then it was quickly shunted to the back pages, while news reporters continued to focus on the Somalia affair. Stories of Canadian heroism were overshadowed by a series of scandals.

Only later, as soldiers began to suffer the effects of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, was the story told properly for the record in front of the 'Sharpe Inquiry' – the Senate Standing Committee on Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA). LCol Calvin brought a handful of key witnesses to testify on the operation and its after-effects on the soldiers and their families. They went before the senate committee to tell the story of the Medak Pocket and its long-term legacy. Their firsthand accounts and the presentation by LCol Calvin and his Regimental Sergeant Major, CWO Mike McCarthy were instrumental in gaining one thing for the soldiers of CANBAT 1 they had never properly received. DND was considering a unit CF commendation for the Medak Pocket operation. LCol Calvin and RSM McCarthy argued resolutely that their soldiers receive individual awards for their bravery and their sacrifice, especially since so many of them had been drawn fromthe Reserve Force.

On December 1, 2002, nine long years after the battle, recognition came in the form of a Commander in-Chief Commendation for the Battle of Medak Pocket. In three guards on parade stood the reservists and retired veterans of Medak, a guard of Patricias returning from overseas, and a guard of Patricias preparing to deploy on another tour in the FRY. The Government of Canada formally recognized the Second Battalion's exceptional performance and steadfast resolve. Individual soldiers were awarded the Meritorious Service Medal (Pictured left)as well as other awards and Mentions in Dispatches for their acts in the Medak Pocket operation. At last came the recognition that the actions of the entire 2 PPCLI BG had been exceptional: recognition of their bravery and loyalty, their steadfast determination to accomplish an impossible task amidst the ruins of a civil war.

3 members of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, and 1 member of the 2 PPCLI Battle Group (1 CER) were killed in action during the United Nations Mission in Croatia.

Name: BECHARD, John Marc Henry Corporal
Age: 24
Hometown: Leamington. Ontario
Killed in action: 6 August 1993

Name: COOPER, Kirk David Private
Age: 25
Hometown: North Bay, Ontario
Killed in action: 6 June 1994

Name: DECOSTE, James Patrick Captain
Age: 37
Hometown: Charolettetown, P.E.I.
Killed in action: 18 September 1993

Name: ISFELD Mark Robert Master Corporal (1 CER)
Age: 31
Hometown: Courtenay, B.C..
Killed in action: 21 June 1994

Lest We Forget